The perverse effect of political patronage
January 4, 2010
By Luis Jose Chavez
Recent conventional processes and the Dominican Revolutionary Party of Dominican Liberation Party highlighted the overwhelming force of political patronage as the controlling factor of the internal processes of these organizations.
Clientelism, understood as a system of informal exchange of favors, has largely replaced the internal democracy and debate of ideas by the power of money, regardless of source, or when the marking of the leaders in power, which is the institutionalized expression of this perverse mechanism of political action.
It was precisely the institutional addresses of our two major parties that drew the line pattern of patronage when they decided to reserve most of the candidates for congressional and municipal charges, to implement an allocation scheme where loyalty to the group of power seems to be merit more important to decide who is awarded or not.
In the case of PRD candidates reserves were assigned almost exclusively to followers of the new Party chief. Those who did not fit into this category had to compete under conditions and a referee who did everything possible to determine, if not all who should win at least who should not win under any circumstances.
Both the PRD and the PLD, the few positions that were subjected to primary elections were clearly determined under the rules of patronage. With few exceptions the candidates gained more economic power or at least more capable of compensation or gratuity, which is the case of those who administer public funds.
It was clear that under this scheme there are only two options to achieve a political or candidate relevant: canchanchán become unconditional leader on duty or find enough money to buy votes in a convention.
Patronage is not a phenomenon unique to the Dominican Republic, but we must agree that in recent years this practice has become a dominant element of the policy Creole, a process that has begun to convert the state and the country's political institutions in a large auction market, where the owners of black money of corruption and drug trafficking are doing the best deals.
However, it seems that Dominican society fails to understand the great threat posed by this phenomenon. The Argentine author Michael Trotta has excelled in one of his works devoted to the subject that "political patronage is opposed to the expansion of social rights, so it is a permanent obstacle to the management of social projects and the creation of democratic processes and participatory management of the public ".
Another definition that helps to understand the degree of perversion of political patronage is offered Wilkipedia:
"In the client states, it relegates the law as an instrument of government. The validity of the law is determined by the degree of dominance of clientelistic ties. In purely patrimonial states, clientelistic relations move to the right as a means of government. The law and institutions depend on the whim of those in power, and the standard does not guide the behavior of individuals. People are no longer equal before the law: the treatment depends on the relationship with those who hold power. The rule of law is a means to achieve a false legitimacy, an instrument of manipulation, and sometimes, of repression. "
Maybe it's time we start to worry.









April 20th, 2010 at 12:55 am
Very good article but really no point beating about the bush to crudísima reality.
April 2, 2011 at 12:28 am
why not give more details of the political system of the Dominican Republic for interested as students. such as the convention and its ideology, etc. convention process. there are many who need this information for college work and we have enough data to come